Imaginative geographies. Derek Gregory. Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T. IZ2, Canada. Just as none of us is. From his first book, Ideology, Science and Human Geography (), Gregory has been one of the most erudite voices arguing for the importance of critical. Geographical Imaginations is at once a profound and penetrating reading of geography as a discipline and a discourse, and also an imaginative and sustained.
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Another interesting interview tied to a book, this time between Jeremy Scahill and Bernard Harcourtover at The Intercept. He explains it dreek this:. And the way of thinking about society is this counterinsurgency paradigm of warfare. So, counterinsurgency started in the s — well, it started long before then, but it kind of crystallized with Western powers in the s and 60s in Algeria, and Indochina before then, and in Vietnam for the Americans.
And it was a particular way of thinking about society, the way society is structured into three groups.
Derek Gregory – Wikipedia
With, on the one hand, a small active minority who are the insurgents, and a large passive majority who can be swayed one way or the other, and then a small minority of counterinsurgents. And that way of dersk has become internalized, second hand. Most, I would say, many in America, but certainly our political leaders are looking at the world through that lens when they look at other countries when they look domestically at their own population, and as a result of that it triggers particular kinds of counterinsurgency practices, really.
The first is the idea of getting total information awareness. So that you can make a distinction between or you can identify that small group of active insurgents. The second strategy is then that you have to rid of the active minority that you identified, just that small group of individuals, the insurgents, and you do that through any means possible.
And then the third strategy is to win the hearts and minds of the masses, basically. We saw that way of thinking become the dominant way of governing abroad particularly with the war in Iraq, but then more generally with the use of drones outside of war derk et cetera, use of total information through the NSA in the way in which everything was captured about everyone to the most minor detail.
And then also trying to pacify the masses in Iraq through kind of some provision of services or just distribution of cash. But then eventually, when this way of thinking comes back to the United States through different forms geogrqphical pacification of the masses. Particularly right now, I would say through forms of distraction, really. A quarter-century ago, an emergent liberal interventionism boasted that the age of absolute sovereignty was over.
As a result of pushback, however, such exceptionalism geoographical evaporated. Coupled with the downturn, liberalism seems but one among many competing powers and truths. Greeted with alarm in the West and dismissed as so much backward or populist reaction, we have to be more open to the run of the present.
If the computational turn has allowed a post-humanist vision of a world that is smaller than the sum of its parts to consolidate, then late liberalism has authored a realist ontopolitics of accepting this world as it is — rather than worrying how it ought to be.
It is a geogrphical world of disruptive logistics, mobility differentials, data asymmetries, vast inequalities, and remote violence: Populism is seemingly an inevitable response to an unwanted future through the reassertion of autonomy. As a political model, it is instructive. Resistance requires the active recreation of autonomy. During the s, large areas of social, economic, and cultural life still lay outside capitalism. For the New Left, this made them potential sites for liberation and revolution.
In a connected world, such nurturing autonomy no longer exists. Political pushback involves the recreation of autonomy via the repoliticization of ground and place through their imbrications with history, culture, and the life that should be lived.
It is a resistance that seeks to renegotiate its position and reconnect with the world anew. And so the question we confront is: Can we reassert a progressive autonomy, or at least a humanitarian autonomy based on a resistance to the dystopia of permanent emergency? A resistance that privileges more the sentiments of spontaneity, circulation, and necessary difference. We cannot imagine the yet to be. We can, however, encourage its arrival by resisting the negative loss and abjection of precarity through a politics of humanitarian critique.
The world has entered an unprecedented period of uncertainty and political instability. Faced with the challenge of knowing and acting within such a world, the spread of computers and connectivity, and the arrival of new digital sense-making tools, are widely celebrated as helpful.
But is this really the case, or have we lost more than gained in the digital revolution? In Post-Humanitarianismrenowned scholar of development, security and global governance Mark Duffield offers an alternative interpretation. He contends that connectivity embodies new forms of behavioural incorporation, cognitive egographical and automated management that are themselves imaginatiins from the emergence of precarity as a global phenomenon.
Rather than protect against disasters, we are encouraged to accept them as necessary for strengthening resilience.
At a time of permanent emergency, humanitarian disasters function as sites for trialling and anticipating the modes of social automation and remote management necessary to govern the precarity that increasingly embraces us all. Post-Humanitarianism critically explores how increasing connectivity is inseparable from growing societal polarization, anger and political push-back. It will be essential reading for students of international and social critique, together with anyone concerned about our deepening alienation from the world.
Introduction — Questioning Connectivity Chapter Two: Against Hierarchy Chapter Three: Entropic Barbarism Chapter Four: Being There Chapter Five: Fantastic Invasion Chapter Six: Livelihood Regime Chapter Seven: Instilling Remoteness Chapter Eight: Edge of Catastrophe Chapter Nine: Connecting Precarity Chapter Ten: Living Wild Chapter Twelve: Conclusion — Automating Precarity.
Archives are often constituted by, and reflect, the concerns of power. The archive is a site of silence as much as a site of statement. Still, archival collections often allow the voices of the dispossessed, the marginal, and those most subject to regimes of power, to speak, albeit often through a narrowed aperture.
Along with the imqginations concerns of officialdom, the archives may also give voice to alternative political desires and ambitions, revealed through moments of contestation and resistance. We invite 20 minute papers that explore some of the following non-exhaustive list of themes: Send abstracts of words, along with name and affiliation and a short bio words to violenceandspace gmail.
It builds on the success of the Conference on Violence, Space, and the Political. What is missing from our highly mediated experience of war? What are their consequences? Cinema is a key site at which questions about our highly mediated experience of imabinations can be addressed or, more significantly, elided. Visible dead bodies and the technologies of erasure in the war on terror, Jessica Auchter 8. Nine cinematic devices for staging in visible war and the vanishing colonial present, Shohini Chaudhuri Reflections on knowing war, Christina Hellmich.
The Syrian Archive has announced the release of a database of Russian-led airstrikes on civilian targets in Syria between September and September Several geographjcal of monitoring alleged Russian airstrikes in Syria reveals a pattern of indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure. In an analysis of videos documenting alleged Russian airstrikes from sources between 30 September and 9 SeptemberSyrian Archive has identified incidents in which Russian forces allegedly targeted civilians or civilian infrastructure of little to no military value.
Content included in this database can be viewed, analysed and downloaded.
Syrian Archive hopes this will support reporting, advocacy, research, and accountability efforts…. This open source database is feographical searchable and queryable by date, gregorj, keyword, relevance, and confidence score. The database includes more than 3, videos of 1, incidents some taken by citizens and activists, some by human imaginationd organisations, and some by the Russian Ministry of Defence ; its compilation involved a series of negotiations with YouTube over the removal of some of the video evidence see here and my extended discussion of visual evidence here.
Airwars maintains an extensive database of all known allegations in which civilians have been reported killed by Russian forces in Syrian casualty events since September 30th Our published month by month records include a case report on each known alleged event; photographs, videos, names of the dead where known; archived links to all known sources; and our provisional assessment as to whether Russian ggregory were likely responsible. Due to the scale of the Russian campaign and the number of reported civilian casualty allegations, our team rolls out monthly assessments as we are able to complete them.
SAGE Books – Geographical Imaginations (): Derek Gregory
Much of our deep assessment work had to be suspended in early given the high number of alleggations against the US-led Coalition. The author has observed lethal missile strikes against Islamic State jihadists in Syria and Iraq alongside the crews involved. He has also conducted extensive interviews with Reaper pilots, sensor operators, mission intelligence coordinators, and spouses and partners. The result is an intimate portrait of the human aspect of remote air warfare in the twenty-first century.
Instead, by focusing on individual crewmembers and preserving personal narrative, Reaper Force brings to the fore a set of questions that have not yet been adequately addressed. For example, no other work of which I am aware properly depicts the Reaper crew in the appropriate set of command relationships within the broader warfighting organizational structure.
Often, the Reaper crew — indeed the whole coalition air component — acts as a supporting command, while the ground force remains the supported command. The result is the often-misunderstood close air support relationship. Though the joint terminal attack controller JTAC on the ground provides clearance for the aircrew to release the weapon, this clearance does not constitute an order.
The compound was in an area occupied by Taliban that had been engaging friendly forces, successfully, over the preceding few days.
It met the criteria gregoory for a strike, we had all the approvals and authorization required. In this case, in contrast with the vertical hierarchy that is often assumed, the command relationships — and the authority of the Reaper pilot — seemed like an impediment for the ground force.
Some RAF pilot half a world away thinks he knows what is best when it is the ground force that takes all the risk. The social and institutional pressures are palatable. In this case, the Reaper pilot gtegory that the armed man under the crosshairs was a farmer in the wrong place at the wrong time and not an enemy fighter in search of a fight. If this is not moral courage, then I do not know what is. From the perspective of those on the ground waiting for a Taliban fighter to open fire at them was not a good tactic — but this was not a Taliban fighter.
Sometimes the roles — those who want to shoot and those who want to withhold the shot — are reversed. With some consistency, the team would depart a nearby building, fire upon gegory through the murder hole, then imaginationx to the building. According to the restrictive rules of engagement under which the U. Geoggaphical were operating, the crew was required to obtain positive identification of the enemy fighters by observing hostile activity prior to obtaining weapons release clearance.